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Abstract 
A substantial literature has investigated the role of relationship lending in shielding 
borrowers from idiosyncratic shocks. Much less is known about how lending relationships 
and bank-specific characteristics affect the functioning of the credit market in an economy-
wide crisis, when banks may find it difficult to perform the role of shock absorbers. We 
investigate how bank-specific characteristics (size, liquidity, capitalization, funding 
structure) and the bank-firm relationship have influenced interest rate setting since the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers. Unlike the existing literature, which has focused chiefly on the 
amount of credit granted during the crisis, we look at its cost. The data on a large sample of 
loans from Italian banks to non-financial firms suggest that close lending relationships kept 
firms more insulated from the financial crisis. Further, spreads increased by less for the 
customers of well-capitalized, liquid banks and those engaged mainly in traditional lending 
business. 
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1. Introduction
1 
The  recent  financial  crisis  has  dramatically  shown  how  banks,  by  modifying  their 
behaviour in the credit market, may propagate and amplify the economic consequences of the 
turmoil. The public debate has been mainly focused on banks’ ability to lend enough money to 
households  and  firms  in  order  to  finance  their  consumption  and  investment  activities.  By 
contrast, less attention has been paid to the dynamic of the cost of bank lending in a severe 
financial  crisis.  This  seems  quite  odd  since  the  response  of  bank  interest  rates  to  systemic 
shocks is another channel through which banks may affect the level of economic activity.  
An analysis of bank interest rate setting behaviour during the crisis has also been largely 
absent from the existing literature. The majority of studies focus on the response of credit 
aggregates and output (the existence of a credit crunch), but pay limited attention to the effects 
on prices. One relevant exception is Santos (2011); however, that paper analyzes the market for 
syndicated  corporate  loans,  which  is  a  quite  specific  segment  of  the  credit  market,  highly 
dominated by large firms. The scant evidence on the effects of the crisis on the cost of credit in 
retail banking is mainly due to the lack of micro data at the bank-firm level. As far as we are 
aware, data on loan interest rates at the bank-firm level are available with a comprehensive 
degree of detail only from the credit registers of a few countries. 
This paper studies the price setting behaviour of Italian banks during the recent financial 
crisis. Using a unique dataset, containing information at the bank-firm level, we are able to 
tackle two main issues. First, we test whether lending relationship characteristics played a role in 
containing the effect on the cost of credit during the crisis. In particular, our aim is to verify 
whether relationship lending helps firms be, at least partially, shielded against the consequences 
of the financial crisis. Second, we test whether banks’ characteristics such as size, liquidity, 
capitalization  and  fund-raising  structure  affected  loan  interest  rate  setting  during  the  recent 
crisis. 
We argue that, in a severe financial crisis, lending relationships may affect the functioning 
of the credit market differently than in normal times when firms are hit by a specific shock. In 
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an economy-wide crisis, banks are also distressed, and they might not be able to insulate firms 
from shocks. Thus, comparing the case of a firm-specific shock to that of an economy-wide 
crisis, one might expect that relationship banks in the latter case lower the cost of credit by less 
than in a firm-specific shock. This may be due to the fact that close lending relationships are not 
enough to shield firms from shocks since banks might also be not able to perform their insurer 
role, and this, ultimately, depends on their endowments of capital and liquidity.  
Along these lines, Santos (2011) finds that firms that obtained a syndicated loan after the 
onset of the crisis paid an additional spread over Libor compared to similar loans they took out 
from  the  same  bank  prior  to the  crisis.  Moreover,  he  finds  that  these  banks  increased  the 
interest rates on their syndicated loans to bank-dependent borrowers by more than they did on 
their loans to borrowers that have access to the bond market. No significant effect of bank-firm 
relationship on interest rate setting is found in the case of the syndicated loan market. The 
presence of similar mechanisms in the bank retail market during the last crisis is therefore an 
issue that needs to be investigated empirically.  
The  case  of  Italy  is  an  excellent  laboratory  for  three  reasons.  First,  the  crisis  had  a 
different impact on different categories of banks (De Mitri et al. 2010), which allows us to 
exploit the cross-sectional dimension to test for heterogeneity in the response to the banking 
crisis. The coefficient of variation calculated on interest rates on credit lines applied to firms 
passed from 25% before the Lehman crisis to 40% in the first quarter of 2010. Second, and 
most importantly, Italy is a bank-based economy so that distortions in credit supply may have a 
sizeable  impact,  especially  for  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises  (SMEs)  that  are  highly 
dependent  on  bank  financing.  Third,  the  detailed  data  available  for  Italy  allow  us  to  test 
hypothesis without making strong assumptions. 
We focus on multiple lending only, which is the situation in which a firm has a business 
relationship with more than one bank. Multiple lending is a long-standing characteristic of the 
bank-firm relationship in Italy (Foglia et al., 1998; Detragiache et al., 2000). The reference to 
multiple lending is very useful because in this way, even in a cross-sectional analysis, we are able 
to include in our econometric model bank or firm fixed effects, which allow us to control for all 
(observable and unobservable) lender or borrower characteristics. Around 80% of Italian non-
financial  firms  have  multiple  lending  relationships,  so  the  study  is  also  relevant  from  a 
macroeconomic point of view.      7 
Since bank interest rates could be sluggish in adjusting, we analyze the interest rates on 
overdraft loans that are modified unilaterally and at very short intervals by credit intermediaries; 
this allows us to fully capture in our quarterly data the effects of the shocks in the interbank 
market or a change in banks’ behaviour due to a repricing of credit risk. Moreover, since our 
analysis  takes  into  account  the  change  in  banks’  price  conditions  over  a  two-year  horizon 
(2008:q2–2010:q1), it is reasonable to believe that the repricing for changes in risk perceptions is 
completely included in our sample.
2 
We investigate overdraft facilities (i.e. credit lines) also for three other reasons. First, this 
kind of lending represents the main liquidity management tool for firms – especially the small 
ones (with fewer than 20 employees) that are prevalent in Italy – which cannot afford more 
sophisticated  instruments.  Second,  since  these  loans  are  highly  standardized  among  banks, 
comparing  the  cost  of  credit  among  firms  is  not  affected  by  unobservable  (to  the 
econometrician) loan-contract-specific covenants. Third, overdraft facilities are loans granted 
neither for some specific purpose, as is the case for mortgages, nor on the basis of a specific 
transaction,  as  is  the  case  for  advances  against  trade  credit  receivables.  As  a  consequence, 
according to Berger and Udell (1995) the pricing of these loans is highly associated with the 
borrower-lender relationship, thus providing us with a better tool for testing the role of lending 
relationships in bank interest rate setting.  
The data come from four sources:  
i)  the Credit Register (CR) maintained by the Bank of Italy, containing detailed information 
on all loan contracts granted to each borrower whose total debt from a bank is above 
75,000 euros (30,000 euros since January 2009; no threshold is required for bad loans); 
ii)  the  Bank  of  Italy  Loan  Interest  Rate  Survey,  including  information  on  interest  rates 
charged on each loan reported to the CR and granted by a sample of about 200 Italian 
banks; this sample accounts for more than 80% of loans to non-financial firms and is 
highly representative of the universe of Italian banks in terms of bank size, category and 
location;  
iii)  the CERVED database, which contains firms’ balance sheet information;  
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iv)  the Supervisory Reports of the Bank of Italy, from which we obtain the bank-specific 
characteristics.  
Our main findings are that close lending relationships allowed firms to be more insulated 
from the financial crisis. This holds regardless of how lending relationships are measured (i.e. 
using the functional distance between the bank and the borrower; the concentration of lenders; 
the length of borrowers’ credit history; and the event that, during the period under investigation, 
a new lending relationship was established or a pre-existing one terminated). We also find that 
the effects of the crisis on interest rate spreads were lower for clients of well capitalized and 
liquid banks or of intermediaries whose business model is more focused on traditional lending. 
To tackle the endogeneity issue that typically arise in trying to disentangle demand and 
supply factors, we also control for the effect of the financial crisis on interest rates by estimating 
a two-equation system that also models the impact on lending quantities. This also helps to 
control for possible forms of cross-subsidization, i.e. banks could modify the spread charged on 
current accounts while modifying, at the same time, the overall lending supply.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes some stylised facts on bank interest 
rate setting after Lehman’s collapse. After a description of the econometric model and the data 
in  Section  3,  Section  4  shows  the  empirical  results.  Robustness  checks  are  presented  in 
Section 5. The last section summarizes the main conclusions. 
2. Some facts on bank interest rate setting after Lehman’s default 
Before discussing the main channels that have affected banks’ price setting during the 
crisis, it is important to analyze some stylized facts that could have influenced the loan interest 
rate pattern. The level of the interest rate on overdrafts is quite strongly correlated with the 
three-month interbank rate (Figure 1). Therefore, as a result of the drop in money market rates 
after  Lehman’s  default,  the  level  of  interest  rates  paid  on  overdrafts  was  also  significantly 
reduced. This  obviously  lowered  firms’  cost  of  financing  in  a  period  of weak  demand  and 
subdued economic activity. However, the reduction in the interest rates charged to firms was 
significantly  lower  than  that  experienced  by  money  market  rates,  and  therefore  the  spread 
between the two rates, typically considered a measure of credit risk (together with monopolistic 
power), increased to a level (slightly less than 4 per cent) similar to that reached in 2003 in 
connection with the default of two important multinational Italian dairy and food corporations 
(Parmalat and Cirio).     9 
The rise of the spread was due to an increase in expected credit risk that materialized soon 
afterwards.  After  Lehman’s  default,  the  bad  debt  flow  ratio  for  non-financial  corporations 
doubled, on average, from 1.2 to 2.7 per cent (Figure 2). That increase was larger in magnitude 
than the one recorded during the 2003 crisis, when the ratio rose to 2.6 per cent, from 1.4 per 
cent at the end of 2002. The drop in bank lending was very large for medium-sized and large 
firms, while loans to small non-financial firms stagnated (Figure 3). 
A glance at Figures 1-3 clearly reveals that the effects of the crisis started in the third 
quarter of 2008. In the econometric analysis, therefore, we will investigate the change in bank 
interest rates and lending in the period 2008:q2–2010:q1. 
Following Albertazzi and Marchetti (2010) and De Mitri et al. (2010), we focus on the 
period after Lehman’s default, which can reasonably be considered an unexpected shock. After 
Lehman’s collapse, the uncertainty regarding banks’ potential losses increased sharply, along 
with  market  risk  aversion  (Angelini  et  al.,  2011). Italian  credit  intermediaries  in  this  period 
experienced a sudden, strong shock to their desired capital level, at a time when adjusting capital 
was extremely difficult if possible at all, so that the banks with lower capital ratios pre-Lehman 
were likely to be those with more inadequate capital ratios post-Lehman. We thus use the pre-
Lehman cross-bank variation in bank capital levels and other bank-specific characteristics to 
investigate post-Lehman bank interest rate setting. The choice of 2008 as starting year of the 
crisis in Italy is also consistent with Schularick and Taylor (2011). 
Figure 4 provides a preliminary analysis of the heterogeneity in banks’ repricing policies 
during  the  period  2008:q2–2010:q1.  The  analysis  suggests  that  both  bank-firm  lending 
relationships  and  bank-specific  characteristics  matter,  but  to  a  somewhat  different  extent. 
Panel (a) shows that the increase in the spread between loan rates on credit lines and money 
market rates differed among firms depending on the length of the credit history. In particular, 
firms with a longer credit history benefited more from the reduction in money market interest 
rates. Panel (b) shows whether the pass-through was affected by the distance between banks’ 
headquarters and firms (functional distance). Functional distance affects the ability of banks to 
collect soft information (Agarwal and Hauswald, 2010) and is negatively correlated with the 
“closeness” of the lending relationship. For firms that are closest to the bank’s headquarters 
(i.e. the bank and the firm are headquartered in the same province) the increase in the interest 
rate spread was lowest. Apart from the case in which the bank is headquartered at the maximum 
distance  from  the  firm,  i.e.  outside  the  firm’s  geographical  area  (North-East,  North-West,     10 
Centre,  South  or  Islands),  the  spread  pass-through  shows  a  positive  correlation  with  the 
functional distance. All in all, these results suggest that functionally close lending relationships 
are beneficial to borrowers.  
Panel  (c)  indicates  that  firm  characteristics  also  matter,  in  particular  firms’  credit-
worthiness. The graph shows that during the crisis Italian banks tried to apply higher spreads to 
riskier firms: the increase in the spread was more pronounced for more risky firms (i.e. firms 
with high Z-scores, used to predict their default) compared to other firms.
3 
The  propensity  of  credit  intermediaries  to  pass  on  changes  in  spread  conditions  also 
depends  on  their  specific  characteristics.  First  of  all,  we  find  that  (panel  (d))  small  banks 
increased their spread by less than larger banks. This interpretation is consistent with a well-
established literature indicating that small banks have closer ties with their borrowers and stand 
by them more in a financial crisis. More generally, we find that banks more oriented toward 
traditional lending activity (we measure this by computing the ratio of loans over total assets) 
increased their spread by less than other banks (panel (e)). 
Panel (f) indicates that banks active in the securitization market had on average a higher 
ability to smooth the effects of the financial crisis on their clients. This result deserves further 
attention because during the crisis the ability of banks to sell loans to the market was drastically 
reduced. However, in the euro area ABSs were typically self-retained and used as collateral in 
refinancing operations with the central bank. This seems to imply that the insulation effect of 
securitization is strictly linked with banks’ decisions on liquidity and capital positions. For this 
reason, in the last two panels of Figure 5 we focus on the effects of liquidity and capital on 
those banks that were not particularly active in the securitization market (those with a level of 
activity below the median). Indeed, for those banks capital and liquidity positions are more 
binding since they can less easily securitize their loans than other banks. Panels (g) and (h) show 
that liquid and well-capitalized banks insulated their clients more in the financial crisis.  
3. Identification strategy and data 
The  financial  crisis  that  unfolded  after  the  default  of  Lehman  Brothers  was  largely 
unexpected. Starting in September 2008, disruptions in interbank markets multiplied and credit 
started decelerating at a fast pace (see Section 2). Therefore, by comparing bank interest rates 
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for each firm in the second quarter of 2008 with those in the first quarter of 2010, we can 
investigate the effect of an unexpected shock on banks’ interest rate setting behaviour. 
The baseline cross-section equation estimates the change in the interest rate applied by 
bank j on the credit line of firm k between June 2008 and March 2010 (Di j,k): 
  k j j k k j k j s d r i , , , e + P + G + Y + a = D   (1) 
The literature that studies banks’ interest rate setting behaviour generally assumes that banks 
operate under oligopolistic market conditions.
4 This means that a bank does not act as a price-
taker but sets its loan rates taking into account the kind of relationship it has with the borrower 
(rj,k),  the  demand  for  loans it  faces  (dk)  and  its  specific  balance  sheet  characteristics  (sj).  In 
equation (1) r j,k represents a vector of variables that control for the bank-firm relationship, dk is a 
vector of firm-specific characteristics that take into account loan demand effects, and sj   is a 
vector of bank-specific characteristics that influence loan supply shifts.  
Changes  in  banks’  pricing  could  influence  some  of  the  firm  and  bank  characteristics  and 
determine an endogeneity problem. For example, an increase in the interest spread could cause a 
default or very simply a change in a firm’s Z-score. In order to avoid such an endogeneity bias, 
all variables rj,k, dk, sj  are considered prior to the start of the crisis (with some exceptions as the 
dummy that highlights those banks that benefited from rescue packages during the crisis). In 
other words, our strategy is to look at how changes in interest rates were affected by bank and 
firm characteristics prior to the crisis. The main cost of this strategy is that we do not capture all 
the forces at work during the crisis, but the results are clean and not subject to the endogeneity 
problem.  
Since  the  model  analyzes the  change  in  the  interest rates  over  a  cross-section  of  overdraft 
contracts over the same period of time (June 2008–March 2010) all explanatory variables that 
have the same impact for the bank-firm relationship during this period, such as general changes 
in  macroeconomic  conditions  (policy  rates,  real  GDP,  inflation,  interest  rate  volatility),  are 
captured by the constant a. Following Albertazzi and Marchetti (2010) and Hale and Santos 
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(2009) we cluster standard errors ( k j, e ) at the firm level.
5 The list of all variables used in the 
regression is reported in Table 1. 
3.1  Bank-firm relationship 
The empirical literature shows that in several circumstances borrowers and lenders benefit 
from establishing long-lasting and close relationships.
6 Relationship lending is a sort of implicit 
contract that ensures the availability of finance to the firm in the early stages of an investment 
project and allows the bank to partake in the returns (Boot, 2000; Ongena and Smith, 2000; 
Berger and Udell, 2006).
7 The role of relationship lending in a period of crisis, however, has 
been less investigated. While a wide literature has studied the role of lending relationships for 
the case of idiosyncratic shocks, i.e. a firm’s financial distress (Degryse and Ongena, 2005), less 
is known about the role of lending relationships in a global crisis. For the case of firm-specific 
shocks,  the  literature  shows  that  close  lending  relationships  are  beneficial  to  firms  since 
relationship banks are more prone to support a distressed borrower (Elsas and Krahnen, 1998). 
Naturally,  this  comes  at  a  cost  for  firms.  They  pay  an  insurance  premium  to  banks  by 
disbursing, on average, more for credit than firms which are not involved in close lending 
relationships (Sharpe, 1990; Petersen and Rajan, 1994). In particular, firms pay relatively more 
for credit in good times and less in bad ones, i.e. when the firm is financially distressed. All this 
means  that  on  average,  firms  involved  in  close  relationships  pay  more  for  credit,  and  the 
differential includes the insurance premium. De Mitri et al (2010) provide evidence on the link 
between bank-firm relationships and the supply of loans during the crisis. 
The literature on banks’ price setting focuses mainly on the effects of monetary policy 
shocks on interest rate changes. The study by Berger and Udell (1992) for the US shows that 
those credit institutions that maintain close ties with their non-bank customers will adjust their 
lending  rates  comparatively  less  and  more  slowly.  Banks  may  offer  implicit  interest  rate 
insurance to risk-averse borrowers in the form of below-market rates during periods of high 
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market rates, for which the banks are later compensated when market rates are low. Having this 
in mind, banks that have a close relationship with the clients should be more inclined to insulate 
them from the effects of a financial crisis on the cost of credit. Along those lines, Gambacorta 
(2008) finds that in Italy those banks with large volumes of long-term business with households 
and firms change their prices less frequently than the others in the case of a monetary policy 
shock. 
What is different in an economy-wide crisis is that banks may themselves be suffering 
from losses which may make them unable to “insure” firms against the effects of financial 
distress. Thus, comparing the case of a firm-specific shock to that of an economy-wide crisis, 
one might expect that relationship banks in the latter case lower the cost of credit by less than in 
a firm-specific shock. Furthermore, a global crisis may affect banks’ risk attitude and then their 
response to firms’ financial distress too. The evidence of the effects of a global crisis on interest 
rate setting is very scarce. One relevant exception is the paper by Santos (2011), who focuses on 
the syndicated loan market and finds that firms that borrowed after the onset of the crisis paid 
an additional 16 basis points over Libor when compared to the loans they took out from the 
same bank prior to the crisis. In addition he finds that these banks increased the interest rates 
on their loans to bank-dependent borrowers by more than they did on their loans to borrowers 
that have access to the bond market. Contrary to the “insurance” theory highlighted above, in 
the  case  of  Santos  (2011)  the  bank-firm  relationship  seems  to  be  associated  with  a  higher 
increase  in  banking  rates  in  case  of  a  crisis.  This  effect  could  also  depend  on  the  risk  of 
forbearance lending (or “zombie lending”) where banks may delay the recognition of losses on 
their credit portfolio by inefficiently rolling over loans (but at higher prices) to corporations 
with which they had close relationships (Peek and Rosengren, 2005; Caballero et al., 2008). The 
effect of the bank-firm relationship on interest rate setting in the case of a crisis is therefore an 
issue that has to be investigated empirically.  
A  crucial  aspect  for  the  analysis  is  the  way  bank-firm  relationship  characteristics  are 
measured.  The  literature  on  relationship  lending  does  not  identify  a  unique  variable  that 
captures  the whole  nature  of  the  lender-borrower  relationship. As  a  consequence, we  have 
included in the specification several alternative measures.  
i) Functional distance 
The distance between lenders and borrowers affects the ability of banks to gather soft 
information,  i.e.  information  that  is  difficult  to  codify, which  is  a  crucial  aspect  of  lending     14 
relationships (see Agarwal and Hauswald, 2010; Mistrulli and Casolaro, 2010). We control for 
the distance between the lending bank headquarters and firm headquarters by four dummy 
variables: DISTh1 is equal to 1 if firm k is headquartered in the same province
8 where bank j has 
its headquarters; DISTh2 is equal to 1 if: a) DISTh1=0 and b) firm k is headquartered in the 
same region where bank j has its headquarters; DISTh3 is equal to 1 if: a) DISTh2=0 and b) 
firm  k  is  headquartered  in  the  same  geographical  area  where  bank  j  has  its  headquarters; 
DISTh4 is equal to 1 if DISTh3=0. 
ii) Creditor concentration. 
We define three measures for creditor concentration: 1) the number of banks lending to a 
given firm (NUM); 2) the Herfindahl index computed on the amount of lending granted by each 
bank to a given firm (HERFDEBT); 3) the share of loans granted by each bank to the firm 
(SHARE), to measure the relative importance of each bank to the firm. The three measures are 
highly correlated and therefore we use them as alternative controls for creditor concentration. 
Only measure 3) is a bank-firm specific variable, i.e. it varies for every combination of bank-
firm, while measures 1) and 2) are invariant by firm and cannot be used when the specification 
includes a firm fixed effect. 
iii) Credit history 
Asymmetric  information  may  be  mitigated  by  means  of repeated  interaction with  the 
banking system by which borrowers gain in terms of reputation (Diamond, 1989). We control 
for the length of the borrower’s credit history by measuring the number of years elapsed since 
the  first  time  a  borrower was  reported  to  the  Credit Register  (CREDIT  HISTORY).
9 This 
variable also tells us how much information has been shared among lenders through the Credit 
Register over time. Information sharing may work as a discipline device (Padilla and Pagano. 
2000)  because  each  bank  accessing  the  Credit  Register  may  be  informed  of  a  borrower’s 
payment difficulty. It may also increase the competition in the credit market since it tends to 
mitigate possible “informational capture” phenomena. In both cases, one may expect that these 
two factors help borrowers access the credit market (i.e. lower interest rates; higher amount of 
money borrowed). Conversely, the existence of information sharing may have perverse effects 
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in terms of banks’ information gathering efforts  since banks may free-ride on other banks’ 
information  collection  activity. We  compute  this indicator  at June  2008, prior  to  Lehman’s 
default. We allow for possible nonlinearities by including a quadratic term for the length of the 
relation. 
iv) Switching relationships 
Terminating or starting lending relationships may also affect a borrower’s access to the 
credit market. Closing an existing relationship may be interpreted as a “bad signal” about the 
borrower’s  solvency  to  other  banks.  For  this  reason,  we  compute  a  dummy  variable 
(CLOSE_REL) which equals 1 if a borrower has terminated a relationship with at least one 
bank, 0 otherwise. Conversely, we also define a dummy (OPEN_REL) which is equal to 1 if a 
borrower has started at least one relationship with a bank that was not previously part of the 
pool of lenders, 0 otherwise. Both of these indicators are computed for the period June 2008–
March 2010.  
3.2 Firm-specific characteristics: loan demand 
Apart from the lending relationship, we control for firm-specific characteristics which 
presumably affect loan demand. The effect of a recession on loan demand is ambiguous. On the 
one hand, the slowdown in real activity tends to lower the demand for credit: Worse economic 
conditions make some projects unprofitable and hence reduce the demand for credit (Kashyap, 
Stein and Wilcox, 1993). On the other hand, the decrease in revenues caused by the recession 
may reduce the reliance of firms on self-financing (Friedman and Kuttner, 1993) and cause an 
increase in the use of credit lines, at least in the short term.
10 In order to control for loan 
demand we define the following variables: 
i) Firm’s size and business legal structure  
We distinguish between small businesses (SMALL_FIRM; i.e. firms with less than 20 
employees) and other firms since a wide literature has indeed indicated that the behaviour of 
small firms (and their credit risk) is quite different from the others (e.g. small firms, due to their 
great opacity, do not issue bonds as larger firms do). We also control for the business legal 
                                                           
10  Using flow of funds data from the United States, Cohen-Cole et al. (2008) show that the amount of lending did 
not decline during the first quarters of the financial crisis. This was not due to “new” lending but mainly to the use 
of loan commitments, lines of credit and securitization activity returning to banks’ balance sheets.     16 
structure with a dummy that takes the value of 1 if a company is organized to give its owners 
limited liability (LTD). This dummy is highly correlated (-0.89***) with the dummy SMALL and 
therefore we use them as alternative controls for firms’ size.  
ii) Firm’s default probability  
The  riskiness  of  firms  is measured  by  the Z-score,  an  indicator  of  the  probability  of 
default which is computed annually by CERVED
11 on balance sheet variables (the methodology 
is described by Altman, 1968, and Altman et al., 1994). The Z-score indicator takes values from 
1 to 9. We have constructed 9 different dummies for each category. A dummy ZSCORE_NA 
takes the value of 1 for those firms for which no Z-score is available. The Z-score is based on 
annual data and refers to the end of 2007. 
c) Firm’s industry and location 
A number of regressions also include a set of industry fixed effects (defined at the 2 digit 
NACE level, yielding a set of 55 industry dummies) and 103 province fixed effects for the 
province in which the firm has its head office. In some of the regressions we introduce firm 
fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity in firms which may be correlated with 
relationship lending variables or with supply side effects. 
3.3  Bank-specific characteristics: loan supply 
According to the “bank lending channel” thesis, an unexpected adverse shock on bank 
funding should have a larger effect on those banks that are perceived as more risky by the 
market. Since non-reservable liabilities are not insured and there is an asymmetric information 
problem about the value of banks’ assets, risky banks suffer more through a drying-up of the 
bond or interbank market.  
The effects of the crisis on bank pricing should therefore be larger for less liquid banks, 
which cannot protect their loan portfolio against adverse shocks simply by drawing down cash 
and securities (Stein, 1998; Kashyap and Stein, 2000), and poorly capitalized banks, which have 
less access to markets for uninsured funding (Peek and Rosengren, 1995; Kishan and Opiela, 
                                                           
11  CERVED is a company which provides financial analysis and balance sheet data on Italian firms. For more 
information, see the Appendix and http://www.cerved.com/xportal/web/eng/aboutCerved/aboutCerved.jsp.      17 
2000; Van den Heuvel, 2003).
12 The effect of bank size is a priori ambiguous. On the one hand, 
small banks, which are  more subject to asymmetric information  problems, should be more 
affected by the crisis (Kashyap and Stein, 1995). On the other hand, small banks may be more 
efficient than larger ones in collecting and processing soft information (Berger and Udell, 2002; 
Berger et al., 2005) and this could amplify their willingness to preserve the bank-firm business 
relationship. This is particularly the case for mutual banks in Italy (Gambacorta, 2004). 
To control for a bank supply response to the financial crisis, we start therefore with the 
traditional indicators of size (logarithm of total assets, SIZE), liquidity (cash and securities over 
total assets, LIQ) and capitalization (excess capital over total assets, CAP).  
The use of these bank-specific characteristics feeds into the current policy debate on the 
new  capital  and  liquidity  requirements  drawn  up  by  the  Basel  Committee  on  Banking 
Supervision (BCBS, 2009 and 2010), usually referred to as Basel III. However, the definitions of 
bank capital and liquidity used in this paper refer to the old world and are different with respect 
to the one adopted in the new regulation. In particular, while the concept of bank capital in 
Basel III is “tangible common equity” (a concept close to TIER I), the notion of excess capital 
used in the paper is calculated using at the numerator a definition of bank capital that includes 
more  items  subject  to  evaluation  (such  as  the  so-called  TIER  II).  Also,  the  liquidity  ratio 
represents a short cut with respect to the new definition. Under the BCBS’s proposal, banks will 
be  required  to  meet  two  new  liquidity  requirements  –  a  short-term  requirement  called  the 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and a long-term requirement called the Net Stable Funding 
Ratio (NSFR). The LCR ensures that banks have adequate funding liquidity to survive one 
month  of  stressed  funding  conditions.  The  NSFR  addresses  the  mismatches  between  the 
maturity of a bank’s assets and that of its liabilities.  
We also control for other bank-specific characteristics which are worth investigating to 
detect loan supply shifts: a) the ratio between deposits and total funding; b) a dummy for mutual 
banks; c) the orientation to traditional intermediation activity; d) the interbank average interest 
rate prior to the crisis; e) the bank’s geographical zone; f) dummies for banks that belong to a 
group or a bank holding company; g) a measure of the importance of loan securitization at the 
                                                           
12  All these studies on cross-sectional differences in the effectiveness of the “bank lending channel” refer to the 
US. The literature on European countries is far from conclusive (see Altunbas et al., 2002; Ehrmann et al., 2003). 
For Italy see Gambacorta (2004) and Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004).     18 
bank level; and h) a dummy for banks that received specific rescue packages during the period 
of investigation. 
The first indicator (a) is in line with Berlin and Mester (1999): banks that depend heavily 
on wholesale funding (i.e. bonds) will adjust their loan interest rates by more (and more quickly) 
than banks whose liabilities are more retail oriented. The reason for this result is that wholesale 
markets are dominated by informed investors who react quickly to any news compared to what 
happens  in  the  retail  market,  where  depositors  tend  to  monitor  less  the  overall  economic 
outlook  because  of  the existence  of  deposit  insurance. Therefore  an  important  indicator  in 
analyzing the pass-through between market and banking rates is the ratio between deposits and 
total funding (RETAIL), including deposits, bonds and interbank borrowing. Banks which use 
relatively more bonds and interbank debt than deposits for financing purposes come under 
greater  pressure  because  their  costs  increase  contemporaneously  and  to  a  similar  extent  to 
market rates. 
The second indicator (b), MUTUAL is a dummy variable for cooperative banks (mutual 
banks), which are subject to a special regulatory regime and have been shown in the literature to 
focus on relationship lending (Angelini et al., 1998). 
The  third  indicator  (c)  measures  how  much  banks  are  involved  in  traditional  lending 
activity. Our indicator is defined as the ratio of total lending to total assets (LENDING). We 
expect a firm borrowing from banks that are relatively more specialized in lending to benefit 
more from the reduction in money interest rates. Indeed, these banks have invested more in 
costly information gathering and then tend to be more prone to insulate their borrowers from 
shocks in order to fully benefit from their information investments, which presumably need 
time to be completely reaped. 
The fourth indicator (d) controls for the level of the average interbank spread during the 
period of financial turmoil (August 2007–August 2008) prior to Lehman’s default. We obtain 
this information from transactions on the electronic market for interbank deposits (e-Mid). As 
in Angelini et al. (2011) we compute the spread between the interest rate on time deposits and 
the repo rates on corresponding maturities. Then we compute an average interbank deposit rate 
by weighting each rate with the amount of transactions. Finally, we compute the variation of the 
average interest rate between August 2007 and September 2008.      19 
To control for geographical differences among credit intermediaries (e) we also insert 
geographical dummies for the main headquarters of the bank. In certain specifications, bank 
fixed effects will help us to control for this and other unobserved heterogeneity in the bank 
which may be correlated with relationship lending variables or with demand side effects. 
Following Ashcraft (2006), we also use affiliation with a group to check for the presence 
of internal capital markets in bank holding companies (f). The reason for this test is that the 
presence  of  internal  capital  markets  in  bank  holding  companies  is  important  to  isolate 
exogenous variation in the financial constraint faced by subsidiary banks. For those small banks 
belonging to a group that do not have direct access to the interbank market we calculate variable 
(d) by using the interest rate applied to the holding bank.  
Banks’ pricing may be also influenced by how active the bank is in the securitization 
market. There is for example evidence that securitization has reduced the influence of monetary 
policy changes on credit supply. In normal times (i.e. when there is no financial stress), this 
would make the bank lending channel less effective (Loutskina and Strahan, 2006). In line with 
this hypothesis, Altunbas et al. (2009) find that, prior to the recent financial crisis, banks making 
more use of securitization were more sheltered from the effects of monetary policy changes. 
However, their macro-relevance exercise highlights the fact that securitization’s role as a shock 
absorber  for  bank  lending  could  even  be  reversed  in  a  situation  of  financial  distress.  We 
therefore include in the econometric model, as an additional control, the ratio of securitized 
lending over total loans (SEC_RATIO) in the three years prior to Lehman’s default (g).  
Finally we compute a dummy (h) that takes the value of 1 if a bank has received a specific 
rescue package in the period under investigation (Panetta et al, 2009).  
Table 2 gives some basic information on the variables used in the regressions. The change 
in the interest rate is expressed in percent. This means that the average reduction in the interest 
rates on overdrafts (across bank-firm observations) during the period under investigation is 1.6 
percentage points. For cleaning outliers, we dropped the first and last 5% percentile of the 
distribution of the dependent variables. The final database includes 194,000 observations and 
around 80,000 firms. More details on the statistical sources are provided in the Appendix.     20 
4.Results 
4.1 Bank-firm relationship 
The results of the econometric analysis are summarized in Tables 3–5. The first column 
of Table 3 presents a baseline equation with bank-firm distance variables, the share of lending 
granted by each bank to a given firm together with both bank and firm fixed effects. The 
inclusion of both fixed effects is possible because we focus on multiple lending only, which, as 
discussed in  the Introduction, is a long-standing  characteristic of bank-firm relationships in 
Italy. This specification allows us to control for all (observable and unobservable) bank and 
borrower  characteristics  and  to  detect  in  a  very  precise  way  the  effects  of  distance.  The 
coefficients show that with increasing functional distance, the change in the interest rates tends 
to be larger. In other terms, firms borrowing at a shorter distance are better insulated from 
shocks, consistent with the view that distance negatively affects the ability of banks to gather 
soft information, thus making it more difficult to establish close ties with borrowers. From an 
economic  point  of  view,  the  difference  in  the  interest  rate  received  by  a  firm  that  is 
headquartered in the same region (DISTh2) with respect to the benchmark case in which the 
firm is headquartered in the same province is equal to 10 basis points. 
The interest rate change during the crisis is negatively correlated with the share of lending 
granted by each bank to a given firm. In other words, in the extreme case that a firm has 
overdraft contracts with many banks but it receives almost all credit from only one (SHARE is 
approximately equal to 1), then the interest rate charged by the main bank is 25 basis points 
lower relative to the other credit intermediaries. 
By using firm fixed effects we are prevented from including other relationship lending 
variables  that  do  not  change  with  respect  to  the  bank-firm  matching.  For  example,  the 
Herfindahl index calculated on the amount of lending granted by each bank to a given firm is 
collinear with the firm effect dummy (and also highly correlated with SHARE). Therefore in the 
second column of Table 3 we drop firm fixed effects and SHARE and include the alternative 
lending relationship variables discussed in the previous section. We also include firm-specific 
characteristics which aim at controlling for demand shifts. The results show that, consistent with 
the literature on relationship lending analyzing the case of firm idiosyncratic shocks, even in the 
case of a systemic financial crisis those firms that have a closer tie with the lender tend to be 
more insulated. The change in the interest rate is lower for firms with more concentrated credit. 
This is also confirmed by the results in column 3, where we replace the Herfindahl index with     21 
the number of banks lending to a given firm: the lower the number of banks that have a 
business relationship with a given firm, the lower is the increase of its interest rate during the 
period of crisis. This result is in line with Elsas (2005). 
Repeated interaction with the banking system also has an effect on bank interest rate 
setting. The variable CREDIT_HISTORY, representing the number of years elapsed since the 
first  time  a  borrower was  reported  to  the  Credit  Register,  is  negatively  correlated with  the 
change in lending rates. The last column in Table 3 checks for the existence of possible non-
linearities in the relationship between CREDIT_HISTORY and the change in the interest rate. 
A  graphic  analysis  of  the  results  is  reported  in  the  first  panel  of  Figure  5  and  shows  the 
simulated drop in the lending rate applied to firms’ overdraft facilities with respect to different 
levels of CREDIT_HISTORY. Since our measure for the duration of a firm’s relationship is 
truncated at 12.5 years the maximum benefit is equal to 0.35 percentage points. 
Terminating an existing relationship is interpreted as a “bad signal” about a borrower’s 
solvency to other banks: other things being equal, the interest rate increases by 2 basis points. 
By contrast, starting a new relationship with another bank that was not previously part of the 
pool of lenders is interpreted as a “good signal”: the interest rate decreases by 5 basis points.  
4.2 Firm-specific characteristics: loan demand 
Apart from lending relationship factors, the transmission of shocks to loan rates depends 
on some firm characteristics. First of all, in all equations reported in Table 3, except for column 
I, we control for a firm’s credit-worthiness (measured at the beginning of the period under 
investigation) by using its Z-score. Since it is reasonable to assume that the crisis hit more fragile 
firms (i.e. those with a high score) harder, it is not surprising that we find that a larger variation 
in loan interest rates for less sound firms. Column IV in Table 3 also indicates that even after 
their riskiness is controlled for, small firms benefited less from the decline in money market 
interest rates. We also checked whether some different behaviour of loan rates emerges when 
we compare limited versus unlimited liability firms. This control (LTD) cannot be used together 
with that for firm size due to high collinearity (small firms tend be unlimited ones). Columns II–
III in Table 3 indicate that this control has no impact on the dependent variable.     22 
4.3 Bank-specific characteristics: loan supply 
In  Table  4  we  report  the  results  of  some  estimations  which  focus  on  bank-specific 
characteristics. Similarly to the previous section, we drop bank fixed effects and we include 
some bank-specific controls. In this setting, we can only continue to control for factors varying 
with the bank-firm pair like our functional distance regressors. 
First of all, we control for the cost of funding in the interbank market (INT_RATE). We 
find that the level of the interbank rate paid on average by each bank in the period August 
2007–August 2008, characterized by financial turmoil, is positively associated with the change in 
the interest rate on overdraft lending. Those banks that suffered the problems in the interbank 
market more were those that were less able to protect their clients.  
Second,  the  dummy  MUTUAL,  which  stands  for  cooperative  banks,  has  a  negative 
coefficient, but the effects are very low and statistically not different from zero. 
As regards the bank-specific characteristics, liquid and well-capitalized banks insulate 
their clients more in the financial crisis. Also, banks with a high proportion of traditional lending 
activity tend to change their prices less. The effect for the variable size is indeed positive: small 
banks protect their clients more. This evidence matches previous results in the literature for the 
monetary transmission channel. Liquid banks can protect their loan portfolio against a shock 
simply  by  drawing  down  cash  and  securities  (Stein,  1998;  Kashyap  and  Stein,  2000).  Well-
capitalized banks that are perceived as less risky by the market are better able to raise uninsured 
funds in order to compensate for difficulties in the funding market (Peek and Rosengren, 1995; 
Kishan and Opiela, 2000; Van den Heuvel, 2003; Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004). Therefore 
the effects on lending generally detected for liquid and well-capitalized banks are mirrored by 
their higher capacity to insulate clients from the effects on interest rates as well. 
To get a sense of the economic impact of the above-mentioned results, well-capitalized 
banks (those that have a capital ratio greater than 2 standard deviations with respect to the 
average) supplied credit lines at an interest rate at least 10 basis points below the average. This 
impact is even higher for highly liquid banks (those with a liquidity ratio above 2 standard 
deviations of the average bank), which applied interest rates at least 28 basis points lower. Small 
banks (those with a size below 2 standard deviations of the bank dimension) applied a discount 
of 24 basis points.      23 
Banks that securitize their assets to a larger extent have, on average, a higher ability to 
smooth the effects of the financial crisis on their clients (see the second column of Table 4). 
This  result  is  interesting,  because  during  the  crisis  the  ability  of  banks  to  sell  securitized 
products directly to the market was drastically reduced. However, in the euro area ABSs were 
typically self-retained and used as collateral in refinancing operations with the central bank. This 
implies that the insulation effect of securitization changed in nature but remained in place. In 
this respect, a similar insulating effect of securitization is detected on lending supply in the US 
and EU countries (Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez, 2011).  
The relationship between capitalization and bank interest rate setting may be not linear. 
For example, using banking data from 1984 to 1993, Calem and Rob (1999) find a U-shaped 
relationship  between  equity  capital  and  risk-taking.  Undercapitalized  banks  take  large  risks 
because of the deposit insurance’s coverage of bankruptcy costs. Risk is then decreasing in 
capital up to a critical level of capitalization at which each additional unit of capital per asset 
increases risk-taking because of the increasing marginal benefit of gambling. In order to tackle 
this point we have introduced a quadratic term for capitalization (CAP_2) in the third column 
of  Table  4.  The  results,  summarized  also  in  the  second  panel  of  Figure  5,  show  that  the 
relationship is slightly non-linear.  
It  is  interesting  to  note  that,  in  contrast  with  the  evidence  for  the  US  on  lending 
(Kashyap and Stein, 1995), the effect for SIZE is positive. The fact that the interest rate on 
overdraft facilities of smaller banks is less sensitive in a financial crisis than that of larger banks 
could  reflect  the  close  customer  relationship  between  small  banks  and  small  firms,  widely 
documented for the Italian case (Angeloni et al., 1995; Angelini et al., 1998; Gambacorta, 2004). 
This result is also consistent with Ehrmann et al. (2003), where size does not emerge as a useful 
indicator for the distributional effect of monetary policy on lending, not only in Italy but also in 
France, Germany and Spain. 
The liability structure also seems to influence banks’ pricing decision. A bank with a high 
proportion of deposits tends to change its interest rates by more. This could be due to cost 
pressure on banks that rely more heavily on a branching structure, which could be particularly 
intense in financial crises when credit losses increase and loan demand is reduced. 
In this paper we chose to use unconsolidated capital and liquidity ratios, in order to 
exploit  the  heterogeneity  of  behaviour  and  conditions  across  banks  belonging  to  the  same 
group.  However,  the  presence  of  internal  capital  markets  in  bank  holding  companies  is     24 
important to isolate exogenous variation in the financial constraint faced by subsidiary banks. 
To check the robustness of the results in the fourth column of Table 4 we introduce a dummy 
for those banks which belong to a group. However, the effect is not statistically significant (see 
column four in Table 4), even if we consider separately a dummy for bank holding companies 
(the results regarding this last specification are not reported for the sake of brevity). 
Finally, the results indicate that firms borrowing from banks obtaining public assistance 
by means of a rescue package (RESCUED) benefited more, other things being equal, in terms 
of the cost of credit, due to an amelioration in banks’ solvency and liquidity positions (see the 
fifth column of Table 4).  
5. Robustness checks 
One possible objection to our results reported so far is that banks set simultaneously 
both prices and quantities. The first robustness check is therefore to see if results are confirmed 
when equation (1) is estimated simultaneously with a bank lending equation. In particular we 
consider the following equation: 
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where the dependent variable is the change in the logarithm of outstanding loans supplied by 
bank j on total credit lines of firm k between June 2008 and March 2010 (Dl j,k). 
To tackle the simultaneity issue, we have estimated the system composed by equations 
(1) and (2) by means of the seemingly unrelated regression equations (SURE) model, proposed 
by Zellner (1962). In this way we allow for the errors term to be correlated across equations. 
This helps us to control also for possible forms of cross-subsidization, i.e. banks could increase 
the spread charged on current accounts while extending, at the same time, the overall amount of 
supplied lending, or vice versa. In the estimation we can include both bank and firm controls, 
but we have to exclude bank and firm effects. For this reason we have enriched the set of 
variables by including a dummy (US>GR) that takes the value of 1 for those firms that have 
used their credit lines for an amount greater than the value granted by the bank, and zero 
elsewhere. This dummy should help to control for those increases in interest rates and lending 
quantities not caused by an autonomous shift in the lending supply by the bank. 
The results reported in the first and the second column of Table 5 are in line with our 
previous findings. We obtain a similar picture for loan quantities, with close relationships being     25 
beneficial also in terms of the amount borrowed. One exception is the share of the lending 
granted by each bank to the firm. While we find that a bank with a high share of lending to a 
given firm tends to reduce the cost of credit more, on the contrary it reduces, other things being 
equal, the amount borrowed. This may be interpreted as the effect of a greater need of banks to 
diversify better their loan portfolio by avoiding too much credit concentration following the 
crisis. It might be the case that banks’ risk aversion increased as a consequence of the crisis. It is 
worth stressing that even considering lending supply, well-capitalized and highly liquid banks 
were better able to shield the credit portfolio of their clients. Interestingly, banks with a higher 
proportion of retail funding protected their clients more by reducing supplied lending less. This 
is  probably  due  to  the  fact  that  in  the  presence of a  high  preference  for  liquidity  and  the 
presence of deposit insurance, retail deposits were less affected than the issuance of bonds and 
CDs by the turmoil on financial markets. 
Following  Albertazzi  and  Marchetti  (2010)  and  De  Mitri  et  al.  (2010)  we  have  also 
estimated the lending equation (2) by using as dependent variable the change in outstanding 
loans extended by bank j to firm k, divided by the firm’s total assets at the beginning of the 
period. The use of this variable rather than the rate of growth of loans is motivated by the fact 
that  in  many  cases  the  amount  of  credit  at  bank-firm  level  at  the  beginning  of  the  period 
(September 2008) or at the end (March 2010) was negligible, resulting in a disproportionate 
number of observations with, respectively, a huge positive rate of growth or a rate of growth 
equal to -100%. The results (not reported for the sake of brevity) are qualitatively similar to 
those reported in Table 5 and do not change the main message of the study. 
Another robustness check has been to estimate the system (1)-(2) including also firms 
that  have  a  relationship  with  only  one  bank.  This  is  possible  because  the  estimation  is 
performed  by  including  both  bank  and  firm  controls, while  excluding  bank  and  firm  fixed 
effects. The results – presented in the last part of Table 5 – confirm qualitatively the previous 
conclusions.  
We  also  try  to  get  a  sense  of  why  bank  capitalization  and  liquidity  were  important 
characteristics  after  Lehman’s  collapse  to  preserve the  bank-firm  relationship.  One  possible 
explanation is that well-capitalized and liquid banks were less affected by the consequences of 
the crisis in the interbank market. If those banks could raise funds at a lower cost, they may 
have been more able to set lower interest rates for their clients and to provide them with more 
loans. We have therefore estimated the following simple equation:     26 
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where the dependent variable is the increase in the average interbank spread between the time 
deposit rate and the repo rate on corresponding maturities applied to bank j between June 2008 
and March 2010 (DINT_RATE  j,). The latter is regressed on a constant (a) and a vector of 
bank-specific characteristics (sj). The results reported in the first panel of Table 6 show that high 
capitalization and liquidity, together with bank dimensions, are important characteristics that 
helped  financial  intermediaries  to  contain  the  overall  increase  of  the  interbank  spread  after 
Lehman’s collapse. Interestingly, the second panel of Table 6 shows that those bank-specific 
characteristics were less important in the first part of the financial turmoil (2007:q2–2008:q2), 
where the increase of the spread was indeed lower for small banks. 
Finally, we have also checked whether results are the same after controlling for firms that have 
specific  access  to  the  syndicated  loan  market.  In  particular,  we  have  included  in  the 
specifications a dummy that takes the value of one if the bank-firm contracts also include a 
syndicated loan. In all the specifications the coefficient of the dummy is always equal to -0.10* 
(significance level 10%). This means that firms that have access to the syndicated loan market 
with a given bank pay 10 basis points less than other firms on the credit line applied by the same 
bank,  other  things  being  equal.  All  other  results  remain  exactly  the  same.  Is  this  effect 
dependent on the specific bank-firm relationship  or on the fact that the firm is less bank-
dependent? To check for this we have constructed another dummy that takes the value of one 
for all firms that have a syndicated loan, independently of the bank. This extends the effect of 
the dummy to all banks, also those with which the firm does not have a specific syndicated loan. 
The  coefficient  of  the  dummy  in  this  case  is  equal  to  0.05,  but  it  is  no  longer  statistically 
significant. This means that the lower interest rate paid on the credit line during the period of 
crisis depends on the specific bank-firm relationship and not on the fact that the firm is less 
bank-dependent. 
It is also interesting to note that for those firms that have access to the syndicated loan market, 
typically very big, the effect of the distance to the main seat of the bank tends to vanish. By 
running the same regressions in Table 3 and 4 only for firms that have received at least one 
syndicated loan, the variables DISTh2, DISTh3 and DISTh4 are statistically not different from 
zero. Conversely, the variable SHARE remains negative and significant (coefficient -0.47**). 
This means that the higher the share of loans granted by a specific bank, the lower the interest 
rate paid by the firms (that also have access to the syndicated loan market). It is worth noting     27 
that this effect, equal to 47 basis points, is roughly double that reported in Tables 3–5 on the 
whole sample of firms. 
6. Conclusions 
The role of relationship lending and bank-specific characteristics in shielding borrowers 
from idiosyncratic shocks has been deeply investigated. Conversely, much less is known about 
their role in an economy-wide crisis. Recently, some papers have investigated the dynamic of 
lending supply in the financial crisis. In this paper, we focus on the cost of credit, an issue little 
investigated by previous contributions because of the limited data availability. To this end we 
have used detailed information at the bank-firm level from the Italian Credit Register, merged 
with Supervisory Reports of the Bank of Italy. The richness of the database allows us to take 
into account bank, firm and bank-firm relationship characteristics. 
We  find  that,  in  an  economy-wide  crisis,  lending  relationships  and  bank-specific 
characteristics matter. In the period June 2008–March 2010, the spread between loan rates and 
the interbank rate increased due to the overall rise in credit risk. However, for those firms that 
had closer relationships with their lenders, the interest spread increased less than that for other 
firms. We have measured the closeness of the lending relationship using different indicators: the 
functional distance between the bank and the borrower; the concentration of lenders; the length 
of borrowers’ credit history; and the event that, during the period under investigation, a new 
lending relationship was established or a pre-existing one terminated. All indicators point in the 
same direction, showing the importance of the lending relationship in shielding clients from the 
effects of the crisis. 
We  also  find  that  bank-specific  characteristics  affect  bank  interest  rate  setting.  In 
particular, banks which are less liquid or less well capitalized were less likely to shield their 
corporate clients from an increase in the loan interest spread. Other bank characteristics also 
mattered for the spread pass-through: banks more oriented to lending smoothed interest rates 
more,  and  the  same  held  for  banks  with  a  high  disposition  towards  lending  activity  via 
securitization. 
All in all, our results indicate that close lending relationships allowed firms to be more 
insulated from the financial crisis and that the ability of banks to shield their borrowers from 
shocks crucially depends on their capital and liquidity condition. From a policy perspective, 
these findings support the focus of Basel III on core capital and funding liquidity risk.     28 
Appendix – Technical details regarding the data 
We construct the database linking a number of different sources. From the Italian Credit 
Register (CR)
13 we obtain information on the interest rate, the amount lent, the type of loan 
contract and the tax code of the borrower. 
The  second  source  of  data  is  the  CERVED  database,  which  includes  balance  sheet 
information on about 500,000 companies, mostly privately owned. Balance sheet data are as of 
December 2007. This is important since credit decisions in June 2008 on how to set firms’ 
interest rates on credit lines are based on December 2007 balance sheet information. Moreover, 
importantly, balance sheet variables from December 2007 are predetermined with respect to the 
dynamic of interest rates (and credit) between June 2008 and March 2010. We match data from 
CERVED and from the Credit Register obtaining a dataset of bank-firm loans matched with 
balance sheet information on the borrower. 
Third, from the database of the Banking Supervision Department of the Bank of Italy we 
obtain information on most relevant characteristics of the banks (size, liquidity, capitalization, 
funding structure). Importantly, for all the banks in the sample, we obtain information on the 
credit concentration of the local credit market in June 2008. We compute Herfindahl indexes 
for each province (similar to counties in the US) using the data on loans granted by banks. 
We include in our sample firms for which we have complete balance sheet information as 
of December 2007 and which have a credit line with at least two Italian banks in June 2008. 
This focuses the analysis on 216,000 observations. We clean outliers from the data, cutting the 
top and bottom fifth percentile of the distribution of the dependent variables we use in the 
regression.
14 An observation has been defined as an outlier if it lies within the top or bottom 
fifth percentile of the distribution of the dependent variables (Dij,k  and Dlj,k). After these steps our 
sample reduces to around 194,000 observations (80,000 firms), which we use for the empirical 
analysis.  
                                                           
13  The Italian Credit Register is maintained by the Bank of Italy and collects information from all supervised 
intermediaries operating in Italy (banks, special purpose vehicles, other financial intermediaries providing credit) on 
borrowers obtaining loans from a single intermediary which is at least equal to 75,000 euros. 
14  Similar results, from a qualitative point of view, are obtained by imposing a less restrictive filter of 1%. In this 
case many of the firms that are recovered have to be excluded from the analysis in any case because of their missing 
Z-scores.     29 
 










Dij,k  Change in the interest rate on overdraft on current account  Dependent 
variables  Dlj,k  Change in the logarithm of total lending 
NUM_REL  Number of banks lending to a given firm 
HERFDEBT  Herfindahl index calculated on the amount of lending granted by each bank 
to a given firm 
SHARE  The share of loans granted by each bank to the firm 
DISTh1  Dummy equal to 1 if firm i is headquartered in the same province where 
the bank j has its headquarter; 0 elsewhere.  
DISTh2  Dummy equal to 1 if: a) DISTh1=0 and b) firm i is headquartered in the 
same region where bank j has its headquarters; 0 elsewhere. 
DISTh3  Dummy equal to 1 if: a) DISTh2=0 and b) firm i is headquartered in the 
same geographical area where bank j has its headquarters; 0 elsewhere. 
DISTh4  Dummy equal to 1 if DISTh3=0; 0 elsewhere. 
CRED_HISTORY  Number of years elapsed since the first time a borrower was reported to the 
Credit register. 
CLOSE_REL  Dummy equal to 1 if a borrower has terminated a relationship with at least 






OPEN_REL  Dummy equal to 1 if a borrower has started at least one relationship with a 
bank that was not previously part of the pool of lenders, 0 otherwise. 
SMALL_FIRM  Dummy equal to 1 if the firm has fewer than 20 employees, 0 otherwise. 
LTD  Dummy  equal  to  1  if  the  firm  is  organized  to  give  its  owners  limited 
liability, 0 otherwise. 
Z-SCORE  Altman’s indicator of the probability of default for a firm. The Z-SCORE 
indicator takes the value from 1 (low risk) to 9 (high risk). For a limited 
number of firms no Z-score is available. 
US>GR  Dummy equal to 1 if the firm has used its credit lines for an amount greater 
than the value granted by the bank, 0 otherwise. 





Province dummies  A set of 103 province dummies in which the firm has its head office. 
SIZE  Log of total assets 
LIQ  Liquidity ratio given by cash and securities over total assets 
CAP  Excess capital given by the difference between regulatory capital and capital 
requirements over risk-weighted assets 
RETAIL  Ratio between deposits and total bank funding (excluding capital) 
MUTUAL  Dummy for mutual banks 
LENDING  Lending to total asset ratio  
INT_RATE  Average interbank spread between time deposit rate and the repo rate on 
corresponding maturities (August 2007–August 2008)  
GROUP  Dummy equal to 1 if a bank belongs to a group; 0 elsewhere. 
SEC_RATIO  Ratio of securitized lending over total loans 
RESCUED  Dummy equal to 1 if a bank has received assistance by means of rescue 







Bank zone dummies  Geographical dummies for the main headquarters of the bank. 
Note: For more information on the definition of the variables, see the Appendix.     31 
Table 2 
SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Variable  Observations  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Dependent variables:           
Dij,k  194,476  -1.579  1.897  -5.420  2.500 
Dlj,k  194,476  -0.017  0.828  -4.359  4.559 
Bank-firm relationship:           
HERFDEBT  194,476  0.392  0.199  0.031  1.000 
SHARE  194,476  0.274  0.236  0.001  0.999 
NUM_REL  194,476  1.478  0.629  0.693  4.290 
DISTh1  194,476  0.293  0.455  0.000  1.000 
DISTh2  194,476  0.279  0.448  0.000  1.000 
DISTh3  194,476  0.169  0.375  0.000  1.000 
DISTh4  194,476  0.250  0.433  0.000  1.000 
CRED_HISTORY  194,476  10.004  3.499  0.333  12.500 
CLOSE_REL  194,476  0.512  0.500  0.000  1.000 
OPEN_REL  194,476  0.415  0.493  0.000  1.000 
Firm–specific characteristics:           
SMALL_FIRM  194,476  0.226  0.419  0.000  1.000 
LTD  194,476  0.731  0.444  0.000  1.000 
Z-SCORE2  194,476  0.016  0.124  0.000  1.000 
Z-SCORE3  194,476  0.167  0.373  0.000  1.000 
Z-SCORE4  194,476  0.195  0.396  0.000  1.000 
Z-SCORE5  194,476  0.201  0.401  0.000  1.000 
Z-SCORE6  194,476  0.296  0.456  0.000  1.000 
Z-SCORE7  194,476  0.063  0.242  0.000  1.000 
Z-SCORE8  194,476  0.167  0.373  0.000  1.000 
Z-SCORE9  194,476  0.011  0.104  0.000  1.000 
Z-SCORE_NA  194,476  0.004  0.061  0.000  1.000 
US>GR  194,476  0.161  0.367  0.000  1.000 
Bank-specific characteristics:            
SIZE  194,476  9.987  1.670  6.122  12.937 
LIQ  194,476  26.705  12.838  4.183  93.366 
CAP  194,476  6.496  4.800  0.235  20.175 
RETAIL  194,476  53.201  13.465  0.798  84.284 
MUTUAL  194,476  0.066  0.247  0.000  1.000 
LENDING  194,476  67.170  14.427  6.363  92.475 
INT_RATE  194,476  0.295  0.088  0.074  0.760 
GROUP  194,476  0.903  0.297  0.000  1.000 
SEC_RATIO  194,476  1.66  2.37  0.000  39.47 
RESCUED  194,476  0.251  0.433  0.000  1.000 
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Table 3 
BANK-FIRM RELATIONSHIP, CREDIT DEMAND AND BANK FIXED EFFECTS  
Dependent variable: change 
in the interest rate on 
overdraft facilities (2008:q2-
2010:q1)
DISTh2 0.091 *** 0.094 *** 0.095 *** 0.089 *** 0.089 ***
(0.019) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
DISTh3 0.231 *** 0.219 *** 0.221 *** 0.213 *** 0.213 ***
(0.025) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
DISTh4 0.164 *** 0.175 *** 0.177 *** 0.166 *** 0.166 ***
(0.023) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)






CRED_HISTORY -0.024 *** -0.024 *** -0.025 *** -0.015 **
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007)
CRED_HISTORY_2 -0.001 **
(0.000)
CLOSE_REL 0.018 0.021 * 0.023 ** 0.023 **
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
OPEN_REL -0.047 *** -0.045 *** -0.048 *** -0.048 ***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
ZSCORE2 -0.043 -0.037 -0.038 -0.038
(0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.072)
ZSCORE3 0.077 0.084 0.083 0.083
(0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066)
ZSCORE4 0.172 *** 0.182 *** 0.18 *** 0.18 ***
(0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063)
ZSCORE5 0.337 *** 0.350 *** 0.347 *** 0.347 ***
(0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063)
ZSCORE6 0.505 *** 0.518 *** 0.515 *** 0.514 ***
(0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063)
ZSCORE7 0.680 *** 0.695 *** 0.691 *** 0.691 ***
(0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063)
ZSCORE8 0.809 *** 0.822 *** 0.82 *** 0.82 ***
(0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065)
ZSCORE9 0.983 *** 0.995 *** 0.991 *** 0.991 ***
(0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076)
ZSCORE_NA 0.675 *** 0.681 *** 0.688 *** 0.689 ***
(0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092)
LTD -0.007 -0.007
(0.028) (0.029)





Number of obs. 194,476          194,476          194,476          194,476          194,476         
Adj R-Squared 0.637 0.085 0.085 0.085 0.085
yes
no no
(II)                             
All bank-firm 
relationship variables, 
loan demand controls 
and bank-fixed effects
(III)                           
Number of bank 
relationships
(IV)                               
Small firms
yes no yes yes yes
Notes: Parameter estimates are reported with robust standard errors in brackets (cluster at individual A firm level). The symbols *, **, and *** 
represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Coefficients for dummies and fixed effects are not reported.
(V)                           
Non-linear effects of 
credit history
yes
yes yes yes yes
(I)                              
Baseline equation for 
distance, bank share 
and fixed effects 
no no
     33 
Table 4 
BANK-FIRM RELATIONSHIP, CREDIT SUPPLY AND FIRM FIXED EFFECTS  
Dependent variable: 
change in the interest 
rate on overdraft 
facilities                        
(2008:q2-2010:q1)
DISTh2 0.023 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.013
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
DISTh3 0.275 *** 0.290 *** 0.288 *** 0.289 *** 0.272 ***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030)
DISTh4 0.093 *** 0.103 *** 0.100 *** 0.102 *** 0.091 ***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
SHARE -0.237 *** -0.241 *** -0.236 *** -0.241 *** -0.227 ***
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
INT_RATE 0.602 *** 0.501 *** 0.518 *** 0.485 *** 0.525 ***
(0.102) (0.102) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103)
MUTUAL -0.067 -0.051 -0.043 -0.027 -0.027
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.047) (0.047)
SIZE 0.037 *** 0.041 *** 0.046 *** 0.037 *** 0.077 ***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
CAP -0.008 *** -0.005 *** -0.002 * -0.005 *** -0.008 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
CAP_2 -0.0008 ***
(0.0002)
LIQ -0.010 *** -0.007 *** -0.009 *** -0.007 ** -0.009 ***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
LENDING -0.015 *** -0.012 *** -0.015 *** -0.012 *** -0.020 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
RETAIL 0.010 *** 0.011 *** 0.010 *** 0.011 *** 0.010 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SEC_RATIO -0.025 *** -0.030 *** -0.026 *** -0.018 ***







Number of obs. 194,476          194,476          194,476          194,476          194,476         
Adj R-Squared 0.6223 0.6227 0.6228 0.6228 0.6237
(V)                           
Rescued banks
yes yes
(III)                        
Non-linear effects of 
bank capital
(IV)                         
Effect for banks that 
belong to a group
yes
Notes: Parameter estimates are reported with robust standard errors in brackets (cluster at individual A firm level). The symbols *, **, 
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Table 5 
BANK-FIRM RELATIONSHIP, CREDIT SUPPLY AND DEMAND  
DISTh2 0.023 * -0.050 *** 0.021 * -0.036 ***
(0.012) (0.006) (0.012) (0.005)
DISTh3 0.233 *** -0.076 *** 0.226 *** -0.058 ***
(0.015) (0.007) (0.014) (0.006)
DISTh4 0.074 *** -0.101 *** 0.072 *** -0.073 ***
(0.015) (0.007) (0.013) (0.006)
SHARE -0.259 *** -0.754 *** -0.156 *** -0.449 ***
(0.019) (0.009) (0.014) (0.006)
CRED_HISTORY -0.025 *** 0.009 *** -0.025 *** 0.009
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
CLOSE_REL 0.012 -0.058 *** 0.015 * -0.075 ***
(0.009) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004)
OPEN_REL -0.040 *** 0.015 *** -0.037 *** 0.012 ***
(0.009) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004)
SMALL_FIRM 0.199 ** -0.052 0.191 ** -0.020
(0.091) (0.042) (0.082) (0.037)
INT_RATE 0.288 *** -0.089 *** 0.261 *** -0.105 ***
(0.054) (0.024) (0.050) (0.022)
MUTUAL 0.022 0.064 *** -0.014 0.057 ***
(0.024) (0.011) (0.021) (0.010)
SIZE 0.112 *** 0.011 *** 0.108 *** 0.006 ***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002)
US>GR 0.606 *** 0.124 *** 0.579 0.105 ***
(0.012) (0.005) (0.010) (0.005)
CAP -0.005 *** 0.004 *** -0.004 *** 0.004 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
LIQ -0.008 *** 0.006 *** -0.008 *** 0.005 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
LENDING -0.013 *** 0.008 *** -0.013 *** 0.006 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
RETAIL 0.009 *** 0.001 *** 0.008 *** 0.001 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SEC_RATIO -0.015 *** 0.003 *** -0.015 *** 0.002 **
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
RESCUED -0.322 *** 0.067 *** -0.29 *** 0.044 ***




Number of obs. 194,476               194,476                194,476               194,476               
Adj R-Squared 0.052 0.079 0.052 0.082
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 





(II) SURE estimation - all credit relationships                             
(Zellner's seemingly unrelated regression)
Eq. 1: Dependent variable: 
change in the interest rate 
on overdraft facilities 
(2008:q2-2010:q1)
Eq. 2: Dependent variable: 
change in the log of total 
outstanding loans        
(2008:q2-2010:q1)
yes yes
Regressors Eq. 2: Dependent variable: 
change in the log of total 




(I) SURE estimation - multiple lending only                                      
(Zellner's seemingly unrelated regression)
Eq. 1: Dependent variable: 
change in the interest rate 
on overdraft facilities 
(2008:q2-2010:q1)
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Table 6 
BANK-SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS AND INCREASE IN THE INTERBANK SPREAD 
Dependent variable: 
change in the average 
interbank spread rate at 
the bank level
SIZE 0.0202 * -0.0115 *
(0.011) (0.006)
CAP -0.009 ** -0.0017
(0.004) (0.002)
LIQ -0.011 *** -0.0003
(0.004) (0.002)
LENDING -0.0105 *** 0.001
(0.004) (0.002)




CONSTANT 1.2974 *** 0.4858 **
(0.408) (0.227)
Number of obs. 168                 168                
Adj R-Squared 0.1478 0.147
(II)                               
Initial period of 
financial turmoil                             
(2007:q2-2008:q2)
(I)                               
After Lehman's default                             
(2008:q2-2010:q1)
Notes: Parameter estimates are reported with robust standard errors in 
brackets. The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 
5%, and 1% respectively. 
     36 
Fig. 1 
Interest rates on overdrafts and interbank rate in Italy (1) 










2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Interest rate on overdrafts (a)
3-month interbank rate (b) 
Spread (a)-(b)
 
Source: Bank of Italy. 
(1)  Current account overdrafts expressed in euros. The vertical dotted line indicates Lehman’s default. 
 
Fig. 2 
Ratio of new bad debts to outstanding loans (1) 












Sources: Central Credit Register and supervisory reports. 
(1)  Annualized flow of adjusted new bad debts in the quarter as a percentage of total loans excluding adjusted bad 
debts at the end of the previous quarter. All the time series are adjusted for seasonal effects, where applicable. The 
dotted line indicates the quarter prior to Lehman’s default.     37 
Fig. 3 
Bank lending to the private sector (1) 







2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010




Source: Bank of Italy. 
(1)  Bad loans are excluded. The series are corrected for the impact of securitization activity. The vertical dotted line 
indicates Lehman’s default. 
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Fig. 4 
Change in the spread between the interest rate on overdrafts and three-month Euribor  
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Fig. 5 
Non-linear effects (1) 
 
Credit history (x-axis): Number of years elapsed since the 
first time a borrower was reported to the Credit Register 
 
Excess capital (x-axis): Difference between regulatory 
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(1) The vertical axis reports the effect on the interest rate on overdraft account in the period 2010:q1–2008:q2 due 
to a change in the variable reported in the horizontal axis. 
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